On the Rhetorical Invention of a Failed Project: A Critical Response to Skeel\u27s Assessment of Christian Legal Scholarship by Caudill, David S.
CAUDILL (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2010 6:06 PM 
 
971 
On the Rhetorical Invention of a Failed Project: A 
Critical Response to Skeel’s Assessment of Christian 
Legal Scholarship 
David S. Caudill ∗ 
The contentious title alone of Professor David A. Skeel’s recent 
work, The Unbearable Lightness of Christian Legal Scholarship,
1
 would like-
ly not offend Christian legal scholars.  Most of us would like to see an 
increase in careful and serious engagement of Christian thought in 
American law and politics.  And even the first few pages of Skeel’s 
paper—bemoaning the fact that the growth of theologically conserva-
tive influence on law and politics is not nearly matched by “profuse 
discussion in the scholarly literature”
2
—sounds right. 
But then things start to go terribly wrong, as Skeel reports that 
scholarly legal literature reflecting “a Christian perspective on law or 
any particular legal issue . . . [e]ven in the 1980s and 1990s . . . re-
mained remarkably thin,” that the scope of Christian scholarship is 
“shockingly narrow,” and that there is “almost no trace of the intellec-
tual underpinnings of” conservative Christianity in politics.
3
  Before 
long, Skeel argues that there is an “absence of Christian legal scholar-
ship,” though he somewhat tempers his conclusion by a later refer-
ence to “the relative absence of Christian legal scholarship.”
4
 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law and Arthur M. Goldberg Family Chair, Villanova University 
School of Law.  This article is based on a paper delivered at the conference Religious 
Legal Theory: The State of the Field, held at Seton Hall University School of Law on 
Nov. 12–13, 2009. 
 1 David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unbearable Lightness of Christian Legal Scholarship, 57 
EMORY L.J. 1471 (2008).   
 2 Id. at 1475–76.  Skeel’s article focuses on theologically conservative Christians, 
including protestant evangelicals and theologically conservative Catholics, which is a 
bit troubling in light of his title—surely, the category of Christian legal scholarship 
includes publications by scholars who address legal issues from their Christian pers-
pective but do not identify themselves as theologically conservative.  Skeel recognizes 
this but opines that “the more theologically liberal mainline Protestants also have not 
produced a distinctive legal scholarship.”  Id. at 1476 n.9. 
 3 Id. at 1476. 
 4 Id. at 1477–78. 
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Of course, there is a body of Christian legal scholarship.  Skeel 
therefore tacks and  authoritatively explains that most scholars “inva-
riably” find themselves writing about the religion clauses—“the 
church-state literature is almost the only place one can find extensive 
Christian legal scholarship.”
5
  Almost?  Well, for Skeel there are “a 
handful of other areas—most notably Catholic scholarship informed 
by . . . the long tradition of natural law theory.”
6
  Extensive?  Well, yes, 
but there is nevertheless for Skeel a “dearth of Christian legal scho-
larship,” notwithstanding “important Christian legal scholarship,” in-
cluding, in addition to church-state and natural law literature, works 
in “international human rights, Christian lawyering, and Christian le-
gal history.”
7
  Dearth?  Well, yes, because all of these are for Skeel “li-
mited areas,”
8
 and they seemingly do not qualify under Skeel’s defini-
tion of Christian legal scholarship.
9
  Hence there is a “strange 
absence of a rich body of Christian legal scholarship throughout the 
entire twentieth century.”
10
 
That would be strange, if it were true; it would be amazing, but it 
is not the case.  Nevertheless, Ted Olsen reads Skeel’s article and dec-
lares that Skeel has “chronicle[d] the scandal of the Christian legal 
mind.”
11
  My argument is that this scandal was rhetorically con-
structed, because Skeel eliminates a lot of Christian scholarship in 
order to support his “unbearable lightness” thesis.  He states that 
“[u]ntil very recently, legal scholars have stayed almost entirely on 
the sidelines,” seldom reflecting “on the relationship between Chris-
tianity and the secular law.”
12
  Never mind the hundreds of articles 
and books, not only in the areas Skeel identifies and then minimizes 
 
 5 Id. at 1478. 
 6 Id.  
 7 Skeel, supra note 1, at 1479. 
 8 Id.  
 9 Christian legal scholarship must provide either a theory derived from scripture 
or tradition, or a “descriptive theory that explains some aspect of the influence of 
Christianity on law, or of law on Christianity”; and “must seriously engage the best 
secular scholarship treating the same issues.”  Id.  It is neither clear why these stan-
dards must be met, nor how all of the extensive, important scholarship that Skeel 
elides fails to meet these standards. 
 10 Id. at 1480. 
 11 Ted Olson, Hope for Christian Legal Scholarship, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Jan. 21, 
2008, http://blog.christianitytoday.com/ctliveblog/archives/2008/01/hope_for_ 
christ.html. 
 12 Skeel, supra note 1, at 1480. 
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(natural law theory,
13
 church and state relations,
14
 human rights,
15
 
Christian lawyering,
16
 and Christian legal history
17
), but also on the 
 
 13 See generally, e.g., Gary T. Amos, Unalienable Rights: The Biblical Heritage, 8 J. 
CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 9 (1990); Gerard V. Bradley, Natural Law, in CHRISTIAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 277 (Michael W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr. 
& Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001); Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Contributions of 
Catholics to the Socio-Political Order, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1221 (2007); Patrick McKinley 
Brennan, Law, Natural Law, and Human Intelligence: Living the Correlation, 55 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 731 (2006); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Who’s Responsible for the Natural Law? 
Comments on Thomas Berg’s “John Courtney Murray and Reinhold Niebuhr: Natural Law 
and Christian Realism,” 4 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 29 (2007); R.H. Helmholz, Natural 
Human Rights: The Perspective of Ius Commune, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 301 (2003); Philip 
E. Hesch & Christopher J. Grabarek, Towards the Deconstruction of Relativism, 6 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 349 (1994); Douglas Kmiec, America’s “Culture War”—The Sinister 
Denial of Virtue and the Decline of Natural Law, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 183 (1993); 
Raymond B. Marcin, Natural Law, Homosexual Conduct, and the Public Policy Exception, 
32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 67 (1998); Kerry L. Morgan, A Constitutional Presidency, 7 J. 
CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 45 (1988); Joan Lockwood O’Donovan, Law and Redemp-
tion: Political Judgment and the Church’s Proclamation, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 573 (2009); And-
rew Phang, American Jurisprudence Through Christian Eyes—Beyond the Nightmare and the 
Noble Dream, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 867 (2004); C. Scott Pryor, God’s Bridle: John 
Calvin’s Application of Natural Law, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 225 (2006); Thurston Howard 
Reynolds II, Natural Law Jurisprudence of the Sermon on the Law, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
231 (2005); Joseph Story, Natural Law, 7 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 31 (1988); Ge-
rald R. Thompson, The Unalienable Right of Property: Examining the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, 8 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 189, 189–203 (1990); Herbert W. Titus, The 
Law of Our Land, 6 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 57 (1987). 
 14 See generally, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995); John Kuhn Bleimaier, God, 
Man and the Law, 39 CATH. LAW. 277 (2000); Robin W. Lovin, Church and State in an 
Age of Globalization, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2002); Charles I. Lugosi, The Rejection of Di-
vine Law in American Jurisprudence: The Ten Commandments, Trivia, and the Stars and 
Stripes, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 641 (2006); Michael Stokes Paulsen & Steffen N. 
Johnson, Essay: Scalia’s Sermonette, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863 (1997); C. Scott Pryor 
& Glenn M. Hoshauer, Puritan Revolution and the Law of Contracts, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN 
L. REV. 291 (2005); Rousas J. Rushdoony, The Private and Public Domains, 71 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 631 (1996). 
 15 See generally, e.g., Martin Shupack, The Churches and Human Rights: Catholic and 
Protestant Human Rights Views as Reflected in Church Statements, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 127 
(1993); Michelle L. Mack, Note, Religious Human Rights and the International Human 
Rights Community: Finding Common Ground—Without Compromise, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 455 (1999). 
 16 See generally, e.g., John E. Acuff, The Wrong Question, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 545 (2005); 
Charles R. Ajalat, Practice, Church, Life, and Society, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 933 (1996); 
Joseph Allegretti, Clients, Courts, and Calling: Rethinking the Practice of Law, 32 PEPP. L. 
REV. 395 (2005); Joseph Allegretti, A Lawyer’s Miscellany: Scriptural Resources for Chris-
tian Lawyers, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1183 (1999); Joseph G. Allegretti, The Lawyer’s 
Calling Revisited: Second Look or Second Thoughts?, 75 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 267 (2001); 
Thomas G. Bost & L. Timothy Perrin, Practicing Law as a Christian: Restoration Move-
ment Perspectives, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 419 (2005); John M. Breen, Baccalaureate Mass Reflec-
tion the Catholic Lawyer: Justice and the Incarnation, 39 CATH. LAW. 269 (2000); John M. 
Breen, The Catholic Lawyer: “Faith” in Three Parts, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
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topics of religious sources of law,
18
 the relationship between religion 
and law,
19
 justice studies,
20
 tax,
21
 legal ethics,
22
 the abortion debate,
23
 
 
POL’Y 431 (2006); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Can the Ordinary Practice of Law be a Religious 
Calling?, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 373 (2005); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalism in the 
Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts at Resuscitation, and Alternate Sources of Virtue, 14 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 305 (2000); John M. A. DiPippa, Jacob’s Blessing, 
Cooperative Grace, and Practicing Law with a Limp, 38 CATH. LAW. 265 (1998); Dan Ed-
wards, A Theological Primer: The Underlying Conventions of Theological Practice, 53 MERCER 
L. REV. 1151 (2002); Samuel E. Ericcson, The Lawyer-as-Advocate, 2 J. CHRISTIAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 139 (1981); Nitza Milagros Escalera, A Christian Lawyer’s Mandate to 
Provide Pro Bono Publico Service, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1393 (1998); F. Giba-Matthews, 
Vocation as a Curse, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1149 (1999); Lee Hardy, A Larger Calling 
Still, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 383 (2005); Emily Fowler Hartigan, Practicing and Professing Spirit 
in Law, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1165 (1996); Michael W. Jorgenson, Whose Ladder Are 
You Climbing?, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1191 (1996); Gregory A. Kalscheur, Ignatian Spiri-
tuality and the Life of the Lawyer: Finding God in All Things—Even in the Ordinary Practice 
of Law, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 7 (2007); M. Cathleen Kaveny, Billable Hours in Ordi-
nary Time: A Theological Critique of the Instrumentalization of Time in Professional Life, 33 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 173 (2001); Howard Lesnick, The Consciousness of Religion and the 
Consciousness of Law, with Some Implications for Dialogue, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 335 
(2006); Raymond B. Marcin, Tolstoy and the Christian Lawyer, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 327 
(2003); Joseph A. Morris, Personal Values and the Character of the Lawyer, 38 CATH. LAW. 
241 (1998); Mark Osler, The Lawyer’s Humble Walk, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 483 (2005); Rus-
sell G. Pearce, The Religious Lawyering Movement: An Emerging Force in Legal Ethics and 
Professionalism, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998); Russell G. Pearce & Amelia J. Uel-
men, Religious Lawyering in a Liberal Democracy: A Challenge and an Invitation, 55 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 127 (2004); L. Timothy Perrin, Lawyer as a Peacemaker: A Christian Re-
sponse to Rambo Litigation, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 519 (2005); Thomas W. Porter, Engaging the 
Law, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1285 (1996); Thomas W. Porter, Jr., The Spirit and the Law, 
26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1155 (1999); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Biblical Prophets as Lawyers 
for the Poor, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 15 (2003); Thomas L. Shaffer, Faith Tends to Subvert 
Legal Order, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1089 (1998); Thomas L. Shaffer, Jews, Christians, 
Lawyers, and Money, 25 VT. L. REV. 451 (2001); Susan J. Stabile, The Practice of Law as a 
Response to God’s Call, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 389 (2009); Kenneth W. Starr, Christian 
Life in the Law, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1359 (1996); Kenneth W. Starr, Christian Service 
in the Practice of Law, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 451 (2005); Randall G. Styers, Protestant Perspec-
tives on Justice and Zealous Representation, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1047 (2001); Mary C. 
Szto, Lawyers as Hired Doves: Lessons from the Sermon on the Mount, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 27 
(2000); Melissa M. Weldon, Honoring the Spirit in the Law: A Lawyer’s Confession of Faith, 
26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1167 (1999). 
 17 See generally, e.g., JOHN WITTE JR., GOD’S JOUST, GOD’S JUSTICE (2006); Frank S. 
Alexander, Constituting a People, 39 EMORY L.J. 1 (1990); Meagan E. Costello, Smashing 
the Tragic Illusion of Justice: The Reprehensibility of the Death Penalty in Virginia, 41 CATH. 
LAW. 255 (2001); Marci A. Hamilton, The Calvinist Paradox of Distrust and Hope at the 
Constitutional Convention, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 
13, at 293; Michael W. McConnell, Old Liberalism, New Liberalism, and People of Faith, in 
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, at 5. 
 18 See generally, e.g., JOHN WARWICK MONTGOMERY, THE LAW ABOVE THE LAW: WHY 
THE LAW NEEDS BIBLICAL FOUNDATIONS, HOW LEGAL THOUGHT SUPPORTS CHRISTIAN 
TRUTH INCLUDING GREENLEAF’S TESTIMONY OF THE EVANGELISTS (1975); Jeffrey Brauch 
& Robert Woods, Faith, Learning and Justice in Alan Dershowitz’s The Genesis of Justice: 
Toward a Proper Understanding of the Relationship Between the Bible and Modern Justice, 36 
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VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2001); J. Nelson Happy & Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, Genesis!: Scrip-
tural Citation and the Lawyer’s Bible Project, 9 REGENT U. L. REV. 89 (1997); Louis W. 
Hensler III, Misguided Christian Attempts to Serve God Using Fear of Man, 17 REGENT U. 
L. REV. 31 (2004); Russell Kirk, The Christian Postulates of English and American Law, 1 
J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 49 (1980); Errol G. Rohr, The Theological Roots of Law, 1 J.  
CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 77 (1980); John W. Welch, Biblical Law in America: Historical 
Perspectives and Potentials for Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 611. 
 19 See generally, e.g., NORMAN ST. JOHN STEVAS, LIFE, DEATH AND THE LAW: LAW AND 
CHRISTIAN MORALS IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES (1961); Frank S. Alexander, 
The Foundation of Law: Theology and Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 325 (2005); Joseph Allegretti, 
The Unity of Law and Religion: A Response to Ackroyd and Vining, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1065 
(2002); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Christian Traditions, Culture, and Law, in CHRISTIAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, at 242; John. J. Coughlin, Law and 
Theology: Reflections on What It Means to Be Human from a Franciscan Perspective, 74 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 609 (2000); Richard F. Duncan, On Liberty and Life in Babylon: A Pil-
grim’s Pragmatic Proposal, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 
13, at 354; Timothy L. Hall, Incendiaries of Commonwealths: Baptists and Law, in 
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, at 340; Randy Lee, Ju-
daism and John Paul II: Coming to Grips with What Law Means in the Hands of God, 45 J. 
CATH. LEGAL STUD. 415 (2006); Randy Lee, Lessons to Be Learned, Lessons to Live Out: 
Catholicism at the Crossroads of Judaism and American Legalism, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 367 
(2005); William Joseph Wagner, Christianity and the Civil Law: Secularity, Privacy and 
the Status of Objective Moral Norms, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 515 (1997); Stephen P. Wink, 
Something’s Happening Here, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1393 (1996); John Witte, Jr., Law 
and Religion: The Challenges of Christian Jurisprudence, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 439 (2005); 
Paul J. Zwier, Looking to “Ground Motives” for a Religious Foundation for Law, 54 EMORY 
L.J. 357 (2005). 
 20 See generally, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, A Catholic View of Law and Justice, in 
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, at 255; Timothy W. Floyd, 
Lawyers and Prophetic Justice, 58 MERCER L. REV. 513 (2007); Thomas L. Shaffer, Should 
a Christian Lawyer Sign up for Simon’s Practice of Justice?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 903 (1999); 
Michael David Lopez, What is Justice?, 1999 BYU L. REV. 933 (reviewing DUNCAN B. 
FORRESTER, CHRISTIAN JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY (1997)). 
 21 See generally, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution 
Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843 (2001); Adam S. Chodorow, Biblical Tax Systems and the 
Case for Progressive Taxation, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 51 (2008); Susan Pace Hamill, An 
Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics, 25 VA. TAX REV. 671 
(2006). 
 22 See generally, e.g., Joseph Allegretti, The Theological Perspective: Lawyers, Clients, 
and Covenant: A Religious Perspective on Legal Practice and Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1101 (1998); Joseph G. Allegretti, Can Legal Ethics Be Christian?, in CHRISTIAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, at 453; Joseph G. Allegretti, In a 
Dark Wood: Dante as a Spiritual Guide for Lawyers, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 875 (2005); 
Douglas A. Allen, A Spiritual Look at Choosing a Legal Career, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 977 
(1996); David T. Ball, Interfaith Legal Services: Taking Stock of a Faith-Based Pro Bono In-
itiative, 72 UMKC L. REV. 301 (2003); Milner S. Ball, Lawyers in Context: Moses, Brandeis 
and the A.B.A., 14 NOTRE DAME  J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321 (2000); Gordon J. Beggs, 
Laboring Under the Sun: An Old Testament Perspective on the Legal Profession, 28 PAC. L.J. 
257 (1996); Teresa Stanton Collett, Professional Versus Moral Duty: Accepting Appoint-
ments in Unjust Civil Cases, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635 (1997); Teresa Stanton Col-
lett, Speak No Evil, Seek No Evil, Do No Evil: Client Selection and Cooperation with Evil, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1339 (1998); Marie A. Failinger, Propter Honoris Respectum: Is Tom 
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Shaffer a Covenantal Lawyer?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 705 (2002); Winston L. Frost, The 
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Role of the Christian Attorney, 2 J. CHRISTIAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 103 (1981); Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, Integration as Integrity: Postmodern-
ism, Psychology, and Religion on the Role of Moral Counseling in the Attorney-Client Relation-
ship, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 233 (2003); Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, Charles H. Oates & 
Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, Professional Responsibility and the Christian Attorney: Comparing 
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Biblical Virtues, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 
(2006); Leslie Griffin, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer’s Work: Legal Ethics, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1253 (1998); Daniel John Hettich & Erica Lee Dinger, They Answer 
to a Higher Standard: The Ethical Obligations of Church Attorneys in Sexual Abuse Cases, 16 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 635 (2003); Steven H. Hobbes, The Lawyer’s Duties of Confidential-
ity and Avoidance of Harm to Others: Lessons from Sunday School, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1431 (1998); Randy Lee, Faith Through Lawyering: Finding and Doing What Is Mine to 
Do, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 71 (1998); Howard Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer in Pluralist 
Society, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1469 (1998); Susan R. Martyn, Are We Moving in the Right 
Dimension? Sadducees, Two Kingdoms, Lawyers, and the Revised Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 121 (1999); Paul S. McConnell, Watergate, Moral Relativism, 
and the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 2 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 37 (1981); Thomas D. 
Morgan, A Christian Perspective on Legal Ethics, 2 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 15 (1981); 
Robert J. Muise, Professional Responsibility for Catholic Lawyers: The Judgment of Con-
science, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 771 (1996); Marc A. Powell, Personal Conflicts and the 
Christian Attorney, 2 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 111 (1981); Thomas L. Shaffer, Law-
yers as Prophets, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 469 (2003); Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and 
Jurisprudence from Within Religious Congregations, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 961 (2001); 
Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963 
(1987); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Tabor Lecture: On Living One Way in Town and Another 
Way at Home, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 879 (1997); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and 
Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988); John W. Stanford, The Christian 
Lawyer: Defending Apparently Guilty Defendants and Using Deceptive Courtroom Strategies 
and Tactics: An Evangelical Biblical View, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 275 (2003); Michael Jo-
seph Woodruff, Lawyers and Sacred Gold, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1411 (1996); Edwin B. 
Youngs, Foundational Principles of Christian Ethics, 2 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 63 
(1981). 
 23 See generally, e.g., ELIZABETH MENSCH & ALAN FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE: 
IS ABORTION DEBATABLE? (1993); John M. Breen, Modesty and Moralism: Justice, Pru-
dence, and Abortion—A Reply to Skeel & Stuntz, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219 (2008); 
Cynthia B. Cohen, Protestant Perspectives on the Uses of the New Reproductive Technologies, 
30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 135 (2002); Larry Cunningham, Can a Catholic Lawyer Represent 
a Minor Seeking a Judicial Bypass for an Abortion? A Moral and Canon Law Analysis, 44 J. 
CATH. LEGAL STUD. 379 (2005); John A. Eidsmoe, A Biblical View of Abortion, 4 J. 
CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 17 (1984); John Finnis, Unjust Laws in a Democratic Society: 
Some Philosophical and Theological Reflections, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 595 (1996); Kath-
leen A. Cassidy Goodman, The Mutation of Choice, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 635 (1997); 
Charles I. Lugosi, When Abortion Was a Crime: A Historical Perspective, 83 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REV. 51 (2006); Michael W. McConnell, Religion and the Search for a Principled Middle 
Ground on Abortion, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1893 (1994); Paul S. McConnell, The Unalienable 
Right to Life, 8 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 53 (1990); John T. Noonan, Jr., Christian 
Tradition and the Control of Human Reproduction, 4 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 1 
(1983); John J. O’Connor, Human Rights, Human Lives, 5 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 
27 (1984); Kurt A. Richardson, Human Reproduction by Cloning in Theological Perspec-
tive, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 739 (1998); Val D. Ricks, Abortion and Latter-Day Saint Expe-
riences with Children and Law, 1 MARGINS 523 (2001); Susan J. Stabile, John Courtney 
Murray and the Abortion Debate, 4 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 87 (2007). 
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family law,
24
 education,
25
 criminal law,
26
 equality,
27
 contract law,
28
 cor-
porate law,
29
 immigration law,
30
 war,
31
 environmental law,
32
 Catholic 
 
 24 See generally, e.g., Don S. Browning, Linda McClain’s The Place of Families and 
Contemporary Family Law: A Critique from Critical Familism, 56 EMORY L.J. 1383 (2007); 
Don S. Browning, Modern Law and Christian Jurisprudence on Marriage and Family, 58 
EMORY L.J. 31 (2008); Gary Chamberlain, A Religious Argument for Same-Sex Marriage, 2 
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 495 (2004); Dan Coats, From Liberty to Dependence: Public Policy 
and the American Family, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (1994); Daniel A. Crane, A “Ju-
deo-Christian” Argument for Privatizing Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1221 (2006); Ma-
rie A. Failinger, Gender, Justice, and the Left Hand of God: A Lutheran Perspective, 9 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 45 (1999); Mark Garavaglia, The Value of the Post-Modern 
Child: Property, Personhood, or Purgatory?, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1 (2002); Cyrene 
Grothaus-Day, From Pipette to Cradle, From Immortality to Extinction, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & 
RELIGION 2 (2005); Daniel Pollack, Classical Religious Perspectives of Adoption Law, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693 (2004); Robert E. Rhodes Jr., On Law and Chastity, 76 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 643 (2001); Victor C. Romero, An “Other” Christian Perspective on Law-
rence v. Texas, 45 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 115 (2006); Herbert W. Titus, Defining Mar-
riage and the Family, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 327 (1994); John W. Whitehead, Judi-
cial Schizophrenia: The Family and Education in a Secular Society, 3 J. CHRISTIAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 49 (1982); John Witte, Jr., God’s Joust, God’s Justice: An Illustration from 
the History of Marriage Law, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 
13, at 406; John Witte, Jr., The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1019 (2001).   
 25 See generally, e.g., Robert John Araujo, Realizing a Mission: Teaching Justice as a 
“Right Relationship”, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 591 (2000); Anthony Bevilacqua, Archbi-
shop of Phila., Keynote Address at the St. John’s Law Review Symposium on Law, Re-
ligion and the Public Good, in 75 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191 (2001); Jeffery A. Brauch, It 
Sounded Great in the Glossy Brochure. So Where Is It? Carrying Out the Mission at a Mission 
Driven School, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 1 (2001); Lynne Buzzard, Religiously Affiliated Law 
Schools: Macro-Dynamics in Contemporary Culture, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 283 (1995); Lynne 
R. Buzzard, A Christian Law School: Images and Vision, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 267 (1995); 
Nicholas P. Cafardi, Catholic Law Schools and Ex Corde Ecclesiae, or What Makes a Law 
School Catholic?, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 7 (2001); Joseph P. Daoust, Legal Education in a 
Catholic University: Mission and Possibilities, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 27 (2000); David 
K. DeWolf & Robert John Araujo, And God’s Justice Shall Become Ours: Reflections on the 
Teaching of Law in a Catholic University, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 37 (1998); Daniel Gor-
don, Ex Corde Ecclesiae: The Conflict Created for American Catholic Law Schools, 34 
GONZ. L. REV. 125 (1998); Randy Lee, Are Religiously-Affiliated Law Schools Obsolete in 
America?, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 655 (2000); Peter Margulies, Commitment, Craft, and the 
Golden Calf: Lessons in the Book of Exodus for Legal Education, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 667 
(2000); Edward J. Murphy, The Sign of the Cross and Jurisprudence, 71 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 577 (1996); Raymond C. O’Brien, A Theological Method for Legal Education, 5 J. 
CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 87 (1984); C. Scott Pryor, Mission Possible: A Paradigm for 
Analysis of Contractual Impossibility at Regent University, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 691 (2000); 
William Quigley, Social Justice Panel: Seven Principles for Catholic Law Schools Serious 
About a Preferential Option for the Poor, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 128 (2003); Mark Sargent, 
An Alternative to the Sectarian Vision: The Role of the Dean in an Inclusive Catholic Law 
School, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 171 (2001); Mary C. Scarlato & Lynne Marie Kohm, Integrat-
ing Religion, Faith, and Morality in Traditional Law School Courses, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 
49 (1998); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Being a Professional Elder, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
624 (1987); David M. Smolin, Religion, Education, and the Theoretically Liberal State: Con-
trasting Evangelical and Secularist Perspectives, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 99 (2005); Ken-
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neth A. Sprang, Holistic Jurisprudence: Law Shaped by People of Faith, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 753 (2000); Lee J. Strang, The Role of the Christian Legal Scholar: The Call for a 
Modern St. Benedict, 20 NOTRE DAME  J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 59 (2006); Herbert W. 
Titus, Education—Caesar’s or God’s: A Constitutional Question of Jurisdiction, 3 J. 
CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 101 (1982); Herbert W. Titus, God, Evolution, Legal Educa-
tion, and Law, 1 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 11 (1980); Dennis Turner, Infusing Ethi-
cal, Moral, and Religious Values into a Law School Curriculum: A Modest Proposal, 24 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 283 (1999); Amelia Uelmen, An Explicit Connection Between Faith and 
Justice in Catholic Education: Why Rock the Boat?, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 921 (2004); 
Grace M. Walle, Doing Justice: A Challenge for Catholic Law Schools, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 
625 (1997). 
 26 See generally, e.g., GERALD AUSTIN MCHUGH, CHRISTIAN FAITH AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: TOWARD A CHRISTIAN RESPONSE TO CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1978); Anthony 
V. Alfieri, Mercy Lawyers, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1297 (2004); Jordan J. Ballor, To Reform or 
Abolish? Christian Perspectives on Punishment, Prison, and Restorative Justice, 6 AVE MARIA 
L. REV. 481 (2008); John J. Dilulio, Jr., Catholic Social Teaching, Racial Reconciliation, 
and Criminal Justice, 3 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 121 (2006); Clifford S. Fishman, The 
Mirror of Justice Lecture: “Old Testament Justice,” 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 405 (2002); Oren 
Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 
MINN. L. REV. 1481 (2004); Stephen E. Henderson, Hijacked from Both Sides—Why Reli-
gious Extremists and Religious Bigots Share an Interest in Preventing Academic Discourse on 
Criminal Jurisprudence Based on the First Principles of Christianity, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 103 
(2000). 
 27 See generally, e.g., W. Burlette Carter, What’s Love Got to Do with It? Race Relations 
and the Second Great Commandment, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, 
supra note 13, at 133; Richard F. Duncan, Wigstock and the Kulturkampf: Supreme Court 
Storytelling, the Culture War, and Romer v. Evans, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345 (1997); 
George P. Fletcher, In God’s Image: The Religious Imperative of Equality Under Law, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1608 (1999); José Roberto Juárez, Jr., Hispanics, Catholicism, and the 
Legal Academy, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, at 163; 
Gerald R. Thompson, Legal Equality: No Respecter of Persons, 7 J. CHRISTIAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 139 (1988). 
 28 See generally, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Parables About Promises: Religious Ethics and 
Contract Enforceability, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 695 (2002); C. M.A. McCauliff, A Historical 
Perspective on Anglo-American Contract Law, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL 
THOUGHT, supra note 13, at 470; Scott Pryor, Consideration in the Common Law of Con-
tracts: A Biblical-Theological Critique, 18 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (2005); Scott Pryor, Prin-
cipled Pluralism and Contract Remedies, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 723 (2009); Val D. Ricks, 
Contract Law and Christian Conscience, 2003 BYU L. REV. 993. 
 29 See generally, e.g., Leo L. Clarke, Bruce P. Frohnen & Edward C. Lyons, The Prac-
tical Soul of Business Ethics: The Corporate Manager’s Dilemma and the Social Teachings of 
the Catholic Church, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 139 (2005); Scott Fitzgibbon, “True Human 
Community”: Catholic Social Thought, Aristotelean Ethics, and the Moral Order of the Busi-
ness Company, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1243 (2001); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faith-
fulness in Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2006); Robert G. Kennedy, Corpora-
tions, Common Goods, and Human Persons, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2006); Susan J. 
Stabile, Using Religion to Promote Corporate Responsibility, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839 
(2004); George G. Higgins, Book Review, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 165 (1999) (re-
viewing STEWART W. HERMAN, DURABLE GOODS: A COVENANTAL ETHIC FOR 
MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEES (1998)). 
 30 See generally, e.g., Kathryn A. Lee, The Religious Imagination, Empathy, and Hearing 
the “Other”: Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. and Immigration, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 923 
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Social Teaching,
33
 the judiciary,
34
 torts,
35
 the death penalty,
36
 pluralism 
studies,
37
 scripture studies,
38
 science,
39
 feminist jurisprudence,
40
 alter-
 
(2006); Elizabeth McCormick & Patrick McCormick, Hospitality: How a Biblical Virtue 
Could Transform United States Immigration Policy, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 857 (2006); 
Michael Scaperlanda, Immigration and Evil: The Religious Challenge, 83 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REV. 835 (2006); Marah Carter Stith, Immigration Control: A Catholic Dilemma?, 84 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REV. 73 (2007). 
 31 See generally, e.g., Darrell Cole, Death Before Dishonor or Dishonor Before Death? 
Christian Just War, Terrorism, and Supreme Emergency, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 81 (2002); Michael J. Davidson, War and the Doubtful Soldier, 19 NOTRE DAME  
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 91 (2005); Thomas L. Shaffer, Nuclear Weapons, Lethal Injec-
tion, and American Catholics: Faith Confronting American Civil Religion, 14 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 7 (2000). 
 32 See generally, e.g., W. Wade Berryhill, Creation, Liberation, and Property: Virtues and 
Values Toward a Theocentric Earth Ethic, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (2003); Harold Coward, 
Religious Responses to the Population Sustainability Problematic: Implications for Law, 27 
ENVTL. L. 1169 (1997); Daryl Fisher-Ogden & Shelley Ross Saxer, World Religions and 
Clean Water Laws, 17 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 63 (2006); John Copeland Nagle, 
Christianity and Environmental Law, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, 
supra note 13, at 435. 
 33 See generally, e.g., John J. Coughlin, The Human Being, Catholic Social Teaching and 
the Law, 1 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 313 (2004); F. Giba-Matthews, A Catholic Lawyer and 
the Church’s Social Teaching, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1541 (1998); Charles J. Reid, Jr., The 
Three Antinomies of Modern Legal Positivism and Their Resolution in Christian Legal 
Thought, 18 REGENT U. L. REV. 53 (2005); Vincent Rougeau, Justice, Community and 
Solidarity: Rethinking Affirmative Action Through the Lens of Catholic Social Thought, 1 J. 
CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 335 (2004); Lucia Ann Silecchia, On Doing Justice and Walking 
Humbly With God: Catholic Social Thought on Law as a Tool for Building Justice, 46 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 1163 (1997). 
 34 See generally, e.g., Francis J. Beckwith, Taking Theology Seriously: The Status of the 
Religious Beliefs of Judicial Nominees for the Federal Bench, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 455 (2006); Stephen L. Carter, Introduction, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 925 
(1996); Timothy W. Floyd, The Practice of Law as a Vocation or Calling, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1405 (1998); Mark B. Greenlee, Faith on the Bench: The Role of Religious Belief in the 
Criminal Sentencing Decisions of Judges, 26 DAYTON L. REV. 1 (2000);  Scott C. Idleman, 
The Role of Religious Values in Decision Making, 68 IND. L.J. 433 (1993); Thomas L. Shaf-
fer, Book Review, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1327 (1989) (reviewing ROBERT A. BURT, THE 
JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED LAND (1988)). 
 35 See generally, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Tort Law and Intermediate Communities: 
Calvinist and Catholic Insights, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra 
note 13, at 486; Douglas H. Cook, A Faith-Based Perspective on Tort Causation, 16 U. ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 455 (2004); Randy Lee, Reflecting on Negligence Law and the Catholic 
Experience: Comparing Apples and Elephants, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 3 (2007); Randy Lee, 
When Would Jesus Sue?: Tort Law in the Hands of Christ, 81 U. DET. MERCY  L. REV. 845 
(2004). 
 36 See generally, e.g., DALE S. RECINELLA, THE BIBLICAL TRUTH ABOUT AMERICA’S 
DEATH PENALTY (2004); Anthony V. Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and Delay: The Moral Poli-
tics of Death Penalty Abolitionists, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325 (1996); Anthony V. 
Baker, “Through a Glass, Darkly . . . ”: Christianity, Law, and Capital Execution in Twenty-
First Century America, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 521 (2005); Stephen B. Bright, The 
Electric Chair and the Chain Gang: Choices and Challenges for America’s Future, 71 NOTRE 
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native dispute resolution,
41
 economics,
42
 and Christian legal theory!
43
  
There are some bibliographical sources available,
44
 and one could 
 
DAME L. REV. 845 (1996); Kimberly J. Cook, Abortion, Capital Punishment, and the Poli-
tics of “God’s Will,” 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 105 (2000); Timothy W. Floyd, “What’s 
Going On?”: Christian Ethics and the Modern American Death Penalty, 32 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 931 (2001); Richard W. Garnett, Christian Witness, Moral Anthropology, and the 
Death Penalty, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 541 (2003); Richard H. Hiers, 
The Death Penalty and Due Process in Biblical Law, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 751 (2004); 
Jill Jones, The Christian Executioner: Reconciling “An Eye for an Eye” with “Turn the Other 
Cheek,” 27 PEPP. L. REV. 127 (1999); James J. Megivern, Our National Shame: The Death 
Penalty and the Disuse of Clemency, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 595 (2000); Mark Taylor, Inau-
gural Address at Princeton Theological Seminary: “The Executed God: The Way of 
the Cross in Lockdown America,” in 1 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 2 (1999); Gerald F. 
Uelman, Catholic Jurors and the Death Penalty, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 355 (2005). 
 37 See generally, e.g., ROBERT DESTRO & MICHAEL S. ARIENS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A 
PLURALISTIC SOCIETY (1996); Randy Beck, The City of God and the Cities of Men: A Re-
sponse to Jason Carter, 41 GA. L. REV. 113 (2006); Jason Carter, Toward a Genuine Debate 
About Morals, Religion, Politics and Law: Why America Needs a Christian Response to the 
“Christian” Right, 41 GA. L. REV. 69 (2006); David S. Caudill, Pluralism and the Quality 
of Religious Discourse in Law and Politics, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 135 (1994); Alfred J. 
Sciarrino, Civil Rights: Religion in the Public Sphere, 30 HOW. L.J. 1127 (1987); David M. 
Smolin, Cracks in the Mirrored Prison: An Evangelical Critique of Secularist Academic and 
Judicial Myths Regarding the Relationship of Religion and American Politics, 29 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1487 (1996). 
 38  See generally, e.g., Daniel Friedmann, From the Trial of Adam and Eve to the Judg-
ments of Solomon and Daniel, 5 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 3 (2003); Andrew R. Sim-
monds, Measure for Measure: Two Misunderstood Principles of Damages, Exodus 21:22–25 
“Life for Life, Eye for Eye” and Matthew 5:38–39 “Turn the Other Cheek,” 17 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 123 (2004); Craig Stern, Crime, Moral Luck, and the Sermon on the Mount, 48 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 801 (1999). 
 39 See generally, e.g., David S. Caudill, Neo-Calvinism and Science: A Christian Perspec-
tive on Post-Daubert Law/Science Relations, in FAITH AND LAW: HOW RELIGIOUS 
TRADITIONS FROM CALVINISM TO ISLAM VIEW AMERICAN LAW 34 (Robert F. Cochran, Jr., 
ed., 2008); James F. Childress, Protestant Perspectives on Informed Consent (Particularly in 
Research Involving Human Participants), 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187 (2002). 
 40 See generally, e.g., Ruth Colker, An Embodied Bisexual Perspective, 7 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 163 (1995); Teresa Stanton Collett, Independence or Interdependence? A Chris-
tian Response to Liberal Feminists, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra 
note 13, at 178; Leslie Griffin, Citizen-Soldiers Are Like Priests: Feminism in Law and The-
ology, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, at 194;  Lynne 
Marie Kohm, A Christian Perspective on Gender Equality, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 
339 (2008). 
 41 See generally, e.g., Joseph Allegretti, A Christian Perspective on Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 997 (2001). 
 42 See generally, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Law and Economics: An Apologia, in 
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, at 208; George E. Garvey, 
A Catholic Social Teaching Critique of Law and Economics, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON 
LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, at 224; Mark A. Sargent, Utility, the Good and Civil 
Happiness: A Catholic Critique of Law and Economics, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 35 (2005). 
 43 See generally, e.g., MICHAEL D. BEATY ET AL., CHRISTIAN THEISM AND MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY (1998); William S. Brewbaker III, Theory, Identity, Vocation: Three Models of 
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easily write an article entitled The Amazing Diversity of Christian Scholar-
ship.  Indeed, when Skeel announces that “70% or more [of Christian 
legal scholarship] surely” involves philosophy, the religion clauses, 
“or some combination of the two,”
45
 he must be engaging in what 
Llewellyn called “armchair estimates” (to contrast such reflections 
with empirical surveys).
46
 
But for Skeel, there is a vacuum, and the “most prominent ex-
ceptions” to this vacuum “are two recent books”: Christian Perspectives 
on Legal Thought and The Teachings of Modern Christianity on Law, Poli-
tics, and Human Nature.
47
  Skeel dismisses the former as not develop-
ing “any particular thesis or set of theses about the relationship be-
tween Christianity and law.”
48
  And the latter, in Skeel’s view, has 
“remarkably little to say about the kind of issues the term ‘law’ brings 
to mind for most of us.”
49
  Who is “us”? 
 
Christian Legal Scholarship, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 17 (2009); Stephen L. Carter, Liber-
al Hegemony and Religious Resistance: An Essay on Legal Theory, in CHRISTIAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, at 25; Elizabeth Mensch, Christianity 
and the Roots of Liberalism, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 
13, at 54; Michael J. Perry, Catholics, the Magisterium, and Moral Controversy: An Argu-
ment for Independent Judgment (With Particular Reference to Catholic Law Schools), 26 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 293 (2001); H. Jefferson Powell, The Earthly Peace of the Liberal Republic, 
in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, at 73; Thomas L. Shaf-
fer, The Radical Reformation and the Jurisprudence of Forgiveness, in CHRISTIAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, at 321; Leslie Griffin, The Trivializa-
tion of Religion, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1287 (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF 
DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993)).  
 44 See generally, e.g., MICHAEL P. SCHUTT, LAW AND THE BIBLICAL TRADITION: SELECT 
BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR CHRISTIAN LAW STUDENTS (2004) (288 entries, including over 100 
books and law review articles, as well as many historical sources), available at 
http://www.regent.edu/acad/schlaw/crossgavel/docs/bibliography.pdf; Christian 
Faith and Action Trust, Law in Christian Perspective, http://homepages.ihug.co.nz/ 
~faithact/BIB14.HTM (last visited June 3, 2010) (twenty-eight entries);  
Robert W. Tuttle, Lawyers and Christian Ethics: A Bibliography, 
https://www.elca.org/What-We-Believe/Social-Issues/Journal-of-Lutheran-
Ethics/Issues/October-2001/Lawyers-and-Christian-Ethics-A-Bibliography.aspx (last 
visited June 3, 2010) (160 entries, including thirty-two books, fifty-three law review 
articles, and six symposia). 
 45 See David A. Skeel Jr., The Paths of Christian Legal Scholarship, 12 GREEN BAG 2D 
169, 178 (2009). 
 46 See, K.N. Llewellyn, On Philosophy in American Law, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 205, 212 
(1934). 
 47 Skeel, supra note 1, at 1480. 
 48 Id. (discussing CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13). 
 49 Id. at 1480–81 (discussing THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, 
POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2005)). 
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Skeel’s evaluation of Christian scholarship borders on the ridi-
culous—what were the twenty-seven legal scholars in Christian Perspec-
tives on Legal Thought doing if not developing a “particular thesis or 
set of theses about the relationship between Christianity and law?”
50
  
Skeel’s minimalistic reading of that book’s “lesson”—that “it is not 
clear whether there is any ‘there there’”
51
—can only be explained by 
his rhetorical need for a “vacuum.”  And when The Teachings of Mod-
ern Christianity fails to offer Skeel his longed-for religious insights into 
“the proper scope of the criminal law or into the rise of administra-
tive lawmaking,” or into “gay rights and gay marriage or gambling 
regulation,”
52
 one gets the impression that no one has ever thought 
about such matters.  What about the previous scholarly record of the 
twenty-eight authors of essays in Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought?  
What about the early (1950s) symposia on law and Christianity at Ok-
lahoma
53
 and Vanderbilt?
54
  More recently, what about the last nine-
teen volumes of Regent University Law Review (established in 1991), the  
Journal of Christian Jurisprudence (published from 1980–1990), the 
Journal of Catholic Legal Studies (published since 2005, the successor to 
The Catholic Lawyer, first published in 1926), and the articles on Chris-
tianity and law in The Journal of Law and Religion (initiated in 1982)?  
Did Skeel even do a bibliographic search of Christian legal scholar-
ship (in books, and in legal and nonlegal journals) over the past few 
decades?  He may have, but his “methodology” would have wiped out 
most of what he found.  For example, if one writes about “[w]hat 
kinds of religious expression are permissible in the public square,” 
which is seemingly a crucial issue in light of the ascendance and in-
 
 50 Id. at 1480.  Skeel’s criticism is misguided because the editors of the volume 
did not mean to suggest that there is a single “Christian” perspective, see Introduction 
to CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, at xvii, xix, and indeed 
wanted to demonstrate “the diversity of attitudes, doctrines, and approaches found 
within the broader Christian community,” id. at xx.  Part I of the volume suggests 
“how Christian perspectives on law might differ from, or complement, current mod-
es of thinking.”  CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, at 1.  
Part II presents four perspectives—synthesist, conversionist, separatist, and dualist—
on the Christian understanding of law.  Id. at 241.  Part III offers six examples of 
Christian approaches to substantive areas of law.  Id. at 405.  Each article develops a 
thesis or set of theses about the relationship between Christianity and law, but I sup-
pose Skeel means to say that the authors did not all agree, hence there is a “vacuum” 
only in terms of there being no single, unifying thesis. 
 51 Skeel, supra note 1, at 1481 (discussing CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL 
THOUGHT, supra note 13). 
 52 Id. 
 53 See A Symposium on Law and Christianity, 12 OKLA. L. REV. 45 (1959). 
 54 See A Symposium on Law and Christianity, 10 VAND. L. REV. 879 (1957). 
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fluence of Christianity in politics, Skeel will deem such efforts “im-
portant but quite narrow.”
55
  On the other hand, Skeel views public 
choice theory, about which he has written,
56
 as a very important area, 
with great promise for robust Christian Scholarship: 
One might expect to find a rich legal literature using public 
choice and related scholarship to explore whether [the influence 
of Christians in law and politics] operates through opinion lead-
ers such as James Dobson or Chuck Colson, through church net-
works or through other, nonchurch organizations; whether it is 
ideologically or economically driven; and whether the influence 
(or its absence) manifests itself differently on different issues.  
Once again, one does not.
57
 
Without denying the influence of public choice theory, one wonders 
why this interesting project is so much more important—more “ro-
bust,” “rich,” and “promising”—than all of the Christian scholarship 
that Skeel rejects as narrow, limited, and forgettable.  When Skeel 
adds “immigration, debt relief and poverty” to the list (alongside pub-
lic choice theory) of untouched areas with obvious relevance for 
Christian scholars, he begins to look narrow and provincial—the tra-
dition of drawing on “philosophy, history, or both” in natural law, 
human rights, legal ethics, First Amendment, and legal history scho-
larship is too “cloistered” for Skeel in comparison with the “vast re-
cent literature on public choice and comparative institutional analy-
sis” that awaits robust engagement.
58
 
As Skeel continues his analysis, he properly identifies the cultur-
al hostility to religious perspectives and the “wages of evangelical anti-
intellectualism.”
59
  One can imagine Skeel mounting an argument 
that acknowledges the efforts of numerous Christian scholars over 
the years, but that explains why they are not a dominant movement in 
legal academia.  Indeed, Skeel acknowledges (i) the revitalization of 
natural law theory,
60
 (ii) the “genuine Christian legal scholarship” in 
Christian lawyering and ethics,
61
 (iii) the “magnetic attraction” of 
church-state issues for Christian legal scholars,
62
 and (iv) the “habitat” 
 
 55 Skeel, supra note 1, at 1478. 
 56 David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal 
Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1997) (book review). 
 57 Skeel, supra note 1, at 1479. 
 58 Id. at 1506. 
 59 Id. at 1486–91.  
 60 Id. at 1495–97. 
 61 Id. at 1497–99. 
 62 Id. at 1499–1501. 
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of legal history.
63
  Each category, however, is downplayed by Skeel—
“theologically informed natural law scholarship” has been supposedly 
absent from legal scholarship until very recently;
64
 the number of 
Christian scholars reflecting on ethics is “small,”
65
 church-state issues 
are too “obvious,”
66
 and Christian legal history is “more influential 
with historians than with legal scholars.”
67
  As to all the “articles that 
feature an identifiably Christian perspective but do not fit into” the 
above four categories, they unfortunately are not “the basis for a se-
rious body of Christian legal scholarship.”
68
  We wonder why, but 
Skeel only offers two examples, which he (for some reason) considers 
“the two most important kinds of articles” excluded from his survey.
69
  
First, there are articles that “use a Biblical passage or person to ex-
plore a legal issue,” which, according to Skeel, are “usually . . . in-
spired by the law and literature movement.”
70
  Skeel’s only examples 
from this supposed “genre” include his own article on Saul and David 
and the “classic article” on the parable of the Prodigal Son, the latter 
of which is not, in Skeel’s view, Christian scholarship.
71
  In any event, 
this “genre is too thin . . . to constitute a category” for Skeel,
72
 but we 
do not know why, because Skeel does not seem to have surveyed the 
field of Christian scholarship.  The second exclusion is the field of ar-
ticles that challenge prominent movements in legal scholarship.
73
  
Skeel offers three examples of good work in this area, but dismisses 
the (unidentified) remainder as failing “to master the literature be-
ing critiqued,” and as failing to “develop a Christian theory of law 
against which the legal movement will be measured.”
74
  These are un-
supported accusations reflecting limited bibliographical research and 
a strikingly arrogant attitude. 
 
 63 Skeel, supra note 1, at 1501. 
 64 Id. at 1495. 
 65 Id. at 1497. 
 66 Id. at 1499. 
 67 Id. at 1502. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Skeel, supra note 1, at 1502. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 1502–03 & nn.110–11 (citing Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the 
Teachings of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984); David A. Skeel, Jr., Saul and David, 
and Corporate Takeover Law, in LITERATURE AND LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING 151 (Paul 
Heald ed., 1998)). 
 72 Id. at 1503. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
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In a follow-up article entitled, The Paths of Christian Legal Scholar-
ship,
75
 which seems to be a response to critics of The Unbearable Light-
ness, Skeel defiantly states that he fully stands by the assessment in The 
Unbearable Lightness.
76
  Skeel’s focus changes somewhat to the absence 
of Christian legal scholarship in elite law journals; he refers to his sur-
vey that, of course, revealed only a handful of discernible Christian 
writings.
77
  Then Skeel reports that he sees hope on the horizon, 
some promising directions, such as Christian sociological jurispru-
dence,  historical retrieval, normative analyses, “nature of Christian 
influence on law,” and, maybe, philosophy.
78
  Skeel cites his own work 
with William J. Stuntz as two of the five examples of these encourag-
ing trends.
79
  But Skeel concedes that “[y]oung scholars in secular law 
schools still face significant disincentives” from conducting Christian 
scholarship and that it may be more difficult to place manuscripts in 
elite journals.
80
  From my vantage point, it has always been difficult to 
place Christian scholarship in elite law journals, even for those with 
no disincentives.  Perhaps that is why Skeel, to his surprise, did not 
find a lot of examples in his survey. 
Returning to The Unbearable Lightness article, Skeel offers some 
examples of missed opportunities—“of roads not taken”—by Chris-
tian legal scholars.
81
  Skeel’s first example is the use of Abraham Kuy-
per as a starting point.
82
  Kuyper, according to Skeel, developed “a 
normative Christian theory of the proper role of law generally.”
83
  
Skeel then identifies Kuyper’s notion of sphere sovereignty—the divi-
sion of authority among separate domains such as family, church and 
government—as a “normative, Christian theory of politics and law.”
84
  
While I agree that the suggestion of a “limited role for the state . . . 
has obvious implications for legal doctrine” and that Kuyper was 
 
 75 Skeel, supra note 45. 
 76 Id. at 174.  Indeed, at the 2009 Seton Hall conference on religious legal theory, 
after the current paper was delivered, Skeel basically (in his keynote address) re-
peated the arguments in his “unbearable lightness” article.  See David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Keynote Address at Seton Hall University School of Law Conference on Religious 
Legal Theory: The State of the Field (Nov. 12, 2009). 
 77 Skeel, supra note 45, at 174 n.16. 
 78 See id. at 174–77. 
 79 See id. at 176 n.27. 
 80 See id. at 181. 
 81 Skeel, supra note 1, at 1506. 
 82 Id. at 1506–07. 
 83 Id. at 1506. 
 84 Id. at 1507–08. 
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“[m]ore a visionary than a systematic scholar,”
85
 it is very misleading to 
dismiss as insignificant the development of Kuyper’s theory among 
Neo-Calvinist scholars as Skeel does: 
Subsequent Dutch theorists attempted to draw out its implica-
tions, and a few more recent theologians and historians have un-
derscored its potential relevance for today.  But the use of [Kuy-
per’s] work in contemporary American legal scholarship has 
tended to be more impressionistic than sustained, and Christian 
legal scholars have not employed it as a base camp for a sustained 
normative account.
86
 
The footnotes to this quotation are interesting because they first ac-
knowledge Herman Dooyeweerd as Kuyper’s best-known follower, 
and then refer to Dooyeweerd’s modal philosophy, which distin-
guishes fourteen aspects of reality.
87
  Skeel does not even mention 
that Dooyeweerd was a lawyer and a philosopher of law, and that he, 
far beyond Kuyper’s views, developed a systematic account of law and 
legal categories from a Christian perspective.
88
  Next, the footnotes 
concede that “several recent articles drawing on Kuyper’s sphere so-
vereignty may foreshadow the kind of sustained treatment that the li-
terature so far lacks.”
89
  Only one article, by Robert Cochran, is of-
fered as an example.
90
 
Skeel also mentions his own modest rule-of-law perspective and 
states that one might imagine other, very different Christian ap-
proaches both to the legal system generally and to particular legal is-
sues.
91
  Skeel need not be so imaginative, however, as other ap-
proaches already exist, but Skeel’s rhetoric of dismissiveness already 
cleared these approaches off the table.  Other Christian legal scholars 
have been, according to Skeel, working in scattered outposts and 
 
 85 Id. at 1508. 
 86 Id. at 1508–09. 
 87 Skeel, supra note 1, at 1508–09 nn.130–31. 
 88 See generally 1 HERMAN DOOYEWEERD, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SCIENCE OF LAW 
(Alan M. Cameron ed., Robert D. Knudsen trans., 2002) (remaining four volumes of 
the Encyclopedia Van Der Rechtswetenschap have not yet been published in English); 
HERMAN DOOYEWEERD, ESSAYS IN LEGAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (John 
Witte, Jr. et al. eds., Albert M. Wolfers et al. trans., 1997); Alan Cameron, Implications 
of Dooyeweerd’s Encyclopedia of Legal Science, in CONTEMPORARY REFLECTIONS ON THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF HERMAN DOOYEWEERD (D.F.M. Strauss & Michelle Botting eds., 2000). 
 89 Skeel, supra note 1, at 1509 n.131. 
 90 Id. (citing Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Tort Law and Intermediate Communities: Calvin-
ist and Catholic Insights, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, 
at 486). 
 91 See id. at 1509–14. 
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producing scholarship that is not important, true, genuine, rich, se-
rious, sustained, or adequately informed.  Skeel looks forward with 
hope, but he looks back with blinders on.  Although this makes for an 
exciting argument for anyone not familiar with the Christian scholar-
ly tradition, that tradition is not as remarkably thin, shockingly nar-
row, or vacuous as Skeel wants readers to believe. 
Skeel writes in the voice of someone who surveyed the landscape 
of Christian legal scholarship, but he did not.  To say that Harold 
Berman was, in the 1970s, one of the few legal scholars who saw that 
religion had contemporary significance for law is simply not true.
92
  
And to limit a survey to six or eight leading law reviews is elitist and 
misleading, especially because Skeel is careful to explain, early in his 
analysis, why there might be a bias against Christian legal scholarship 
in elite law schools.  Finding an absence there is hardly strange, sur-
prising, or shocking. 
Then there is Skeel’s rhetorical habit of referring to the Keats-
like “brightest star” (Mike McConnell),
93
 the sole other “prominent[]” 
figure (Steven Smith),
94
 and “the two leading Christian legal theor-
ists” (Michael Perry and Kent Greenawalt),
95
 which should leave read-
ers wondering where everyone went.  Skeel actually mentions Noo-
nan, Finnis, Glendon, Robert P. George, Hittinger, Hartigan, Collett, 
Yoder, Hauerwas, Shaffer, Cochran, Allegretti, Milner S. Ball, Les-
nick, Gerber, Uelmen, Tuttle, Berg, Stephen L. Carter, Smolin, Mod-
ak-Truran, Davison M. Douglas, Witte, Bainbridge, and Brewbaker
96
—
a bibliography of their scholarship alone would be imposing.  But he 
fails to mention many more scholars with multiple publications in the 
 
 92 See generally, e.g., LYNN ROBERT BUZZARD, CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND 
JUSTICE (1977); JOHN WARWICK MONTGOMERY, THE LAW ABOVE THE LAW (1975); 
THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER:  LAW FOR THE INNOCENT 
(1981); Frank S. Alexander, Validity and Function of Law: The Reformation Doctrine of 
Usus Legis, 31 MERCER L. REV. 509 (1980); Milner S. Ball, The Politics of God in the Ma-
turation of the Law, 4 GA. L. REV. 555 (1970); Michael D. Bayles, Legislating Morality, 22 
WAYNE L. REV. 759 (1976); Richard John Neuhaus, Law and the Rightness of Things, 14 
VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1979); William Stringfellow, Christianity, Poverty, and the Practice of 
Law, 8 CAP. U. L. REV. 451 (1979); supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing symposia on law and Christianity in 1957 and 1959).  
 93 Skeel, supra note 1, at 1499. 
 94 Id. at 1499 n.95. 
 95 Id. at 1500 & n.100. 
 96 See id. at 1495–1504 & nn.81–85, 87–88, 93, 97–98, 105, 108, 114, 116. 
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field.
97
  Even if Skeel is impliedly arguing that the others are not in-
fluential, his empirical metric is not clear. 
When discussing the law and literature movement elsewhere, 
Skeel is just as limited in his representation of that field.  He cites a 
highly dismissive article by Jane Baron, which is interesting not only 
because Skeel shares her style, but also one of her metrics—does law 
and literature have a single theory?
98
  Hence Skeel’s establishment of 
a “test” that must be met by Christian scholars to ensure uniformity in 
the enterprise. 
Let us be clear: if Skeel is going to do a survey-type article to 
prove the relative absence of Christian legal scholarship, then he 
needs to consult the literature.  And Skeel cannot escape that respon-
sibility by defining Christian legal scholarship in a way that eliminates 
much of it or by using words like “informed” or “sustained treatment” 
to minimize the efforts of numerous Christian legal scholars.  If the 
argument is that Christian scholarship does not meet Skeel’s stan-
dard, then Skeel should make that argument and defend that stan-
dard.  But Skeel should not pretend to do a survey.  For example, as 
to scholarship inspired by Kuyper and neo-Calvinism, it is not only 
sphere sovereignty that Christian scholars have used.  Dooyeweerd’s 
critique of secular-faith systems is just as Kuyperian, just as inspira-
 
 97 In no particular order, and without being exhaustive, Lyman Johnson, Samuel 
Calhaun, Andrew McThenia, William Stringfellow, C. Scott Pryor, Lynn Buzzard, 
Frank S. Alexander, Timothy Hall, Doug Kmiec, Michael Perry, Patrick Brennan, Ri-
chard Garnett, Gerald V. Bradley, Elizabeth Mensch, Harold Vogel, John Whitehead, 
Randy Lee, George Fletcher, Ed Gaffney, Jack Sammons, Herbert Titus, Chris Wolfe, 
Philip Johnson, Michael Schutt, Jeff Brauch, Michael Beaty, Paul Zwier, Michael 
Bayles, Doug Sturm, Timothy Floyd, Thomas Morgan, and Paul Marshall. 
 98 See David A. Skeel, Jr., Lawrence Joseph and Law and Literature, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 
921 (2009).  Skeel adopts the characterization of the law and literature enterprise 
that Jane Baron presented in Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 
YALE L.J. 1059 (1999).  See Skeel, supra, at 926 n.30.  For a critique of Professor Ba-
ron’s negative evaluation of the law and literature movement, including her view that 
there is no movement (because of deep divisions), see David S. Caudill, Law-and-
Literature, Literature-and-Science, and Enhancing the Discourse of Law/Science Relations, 27 
J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 8–12 (2003).  Skeel’s presumptiveness in establishing a “simple test 
for Christian legal scholarship,” with two criteria that “must” be satisfied seems obli-
quely related to his negative assessment of (unnamed) scholars engaged in Christian 
critiques of prominent legal movements for their failure to develop a Christian 
theory of law against which the prominent movement can be measured.  Skeel, supra 
note 1, at 1503–04 (“The reason for exclusion can be summed up in the adage, ‘it 
takes a theory to beat a theory.’”). 
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tional, and just as important for Christian legal theory as is sphere so-
vereignty.
99
 
In conclusion, I should mention three qualifications to my ar-
gument that Skeel presents a misleading picture of the state of the 
field of Christian legal scholarship: 
First, I am not arguing that Christian legal scholarship is a major 
force in American law and legal theory—it is not.  Indeed, Robert 
Cochran, Michael McConnell, and Angela Carmella, nearly ten years 
ago, delivered an assessment that presaged Skeel’s report: 
[T]here is a strange silence on the part of Jesus’ own followers.  
Where can one hear the expression of Christian perspectives on 
law and legal theory?  There are . . . surprisingly few books or ar-
ticles applying the gospel of Jesus Christ, other than in a few spe-
cialized areas like legal ethics and church-state law.
100
 
Agreeing with Cochran, Harold Berman at that time stated, “With 
rare exceptions, American legal scholars of Christian faith have not, 
during the past century, attempted to explain law in terms of their 
faith.”
101
  (On the other hand, Berman concedes that “in the 1980s 
and 1990s, a number of Christian legal scholars have come out of the 
closet,” and he mentions the Christian Legal Society, The Journal of 
Law and Religion, and the law and religion programs at some law 
schools—like Emory—as examples.
102
)  There is a bit of hyperbole in 
these assessments, both of them appearing at the outset of Christian 
Perspectives on Legal Thought in order to advertise the uniqueness of 
the project.  More importantly, these assessments were made ten 
years ago, and were accompanied neither by the dismissiveness that 
characterizes Skeel’s representation of the field nor the pretense of 
doing a survey.  A lot has happened in the last ten years.
103
 
 
 99  See generally, e.g., H.J. VAN ELKEMA HOMMES, MAJOR TRENDS IN THE HISTORY OF 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1979); David S. Caudill, A Calvinist Perspective on the Place of Faith 
in Legal Scholarship, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, at 
307; Paul Zwier, Looking to “Ground Motives” for a Religious Foundation for Law, 54 
EMORY L.J. 357 (2005). 
 100 Introduction, supra note 50, at xviii. 
 101 Harold Berman, Foreword to CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra 
note 13, at xi, xi. 
 102 Id. at xii. 
 103 See supra notes 13–43 (citing numerous works published between 2000 and 
2009). 
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Second, Skeel has suggested, in a public presentation of his “un-
bearable lightness” thesis,
104
 that he was trying to be controversial, 
which implies some level of exaggeration to make a point.  Yet for 
those readers who have not heard such mediating remarks, Skeel’s 
articles convey utter scholarly seriousness. 
Third, and finally, this Essay does not engage most of the subs-
tantive historical analysis, theoretical proposals, or reports of recent 
developments, such as the debt-relief mechanisms in the Internation-
al Religious Freedom Act of 1998, that appear in Skeel’s Unbearable 
Lightness.  Rather, I have concerned myself with the packaging of his 
arguments—the rhetorical construction of a dearth or vacuum, the 
dismissive tone, and the authoritative voice that veils the bibliograph-
ic weaknesses of Skeel’s evaluation.  In a word, Skeel’s contextualiza-
tion of his presentation is misleading; it is as if he needed a crisis to 
add urgency to his substantive proposals and to render those propos-
als as solutions rather than as fairly conventional contributions to an 
ongoing discourse concerning Christianity and law. 
 
 
 104 David A. Skeel, Jr., Keynote Address at Seton Hall University School of Law 
Conference on Religious Legal Theory: The State of the Field (Nov. 12, 2009). 
